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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the Ebro inter-basin transfer, which was the
main project of the Spanish National Hydrological Plan. The
Ebro transfer was prompted by pervasive pressures, scarcity, and
degradation of southeastern basins in Spain. The heated policy
debate on the Ebro transfer highlights the difficulties of achieving
a sustainable management of water resources because of the
conflicting interests of stakeholders and regions. Alternatives to
the Ebro transfer show that acceptable outcomes combine demand
and supply measures. Nevertheless, implementation could be
difficult, requiring compensation to farmers; otherwise, an
excessive burden on farmers would be met by social opposition,
leading to the failure of the measures.
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INTRODUCTION
While never as important in shaping society as the hydraulic
civilizations of the ancient Middle and Far East,1 irrigation has been
important in the Iberian Peninsula since ancient times. Significant
waterworks were first introduced by the Carthaginians in the
southeastern peninsula, and later waterworks were developed by the
Romans for urban centers (e.g., in Tarraco, Emerita Augusta, Caesar
Augusta), mineral extraction, and irrigation. The highest dam built
during the Roman Empire was the 34 meter (m) Almonacid de la Cuba
dam in the Ebro basin,2 with a system of very old and complex canals
supplying water to the irrigation fields of Campo de Belchite. In the
Middle Ages, the Islamic Califato de C6rdoba (929-1010) undertook
substantial irrigation projects in Murcia, Valencia, and Granada to
develop horticultural crops, sugar cane, and white mulberry trees to feed
silkworm. Sugar cane was planted along the Mediterranean coast, from
where it later passed to America during Spanish colonization. Muslim
farmers from Granada contributed to the development of new irrigated
areas along rivers such as the Guadalquivir, and their knowledge of
irrigation techniques was passed down to subsequent generations of
farmers.3 The water court in Valencia (Tribunal de las Aguas) is an
example of a water institution from the Middle Ages that has been
settling water disputes among farmers for the last thousand years. After
the sixteenth century, two major irrigation and transport projects
undertaken were the Canal Imperial de Arag6n and the Canal de
Castilla, which were largely advanced in the eighteenth century.
During the nineteenth century, major water projects were
partially financed by the private sector to provide urban supply facilities
in Madrid (e.g., the Canal de Isabel II), Valencia, Gerona, and Cartagena,
but the policy of private financing failed in agricultural irrigation
projects. By the end of the nineteenth century, public involvement in
irrigation projects was considered essential, based on the importance of
1. See generally KARL A. WITTFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM (1957) (a comparative
study).
2. Other dams built during Roman times include the 22 m Proserpina dam (M6rida,
Spain), and the 21 m Harbaqa (Palmyra, Siria) and Cornalvo (Badajoz, Spain) dams. See
MIGUEL ARENILLAS PARRA, OBRAS HIDRAULICAS ROMANAS EN HISPANIA (2002),
http://traianus.rediris.es/textos/hidraulicas.htm.
3. See generally ANDREW M. WATSON, INNOVACIONES EN LA AGRICULTURA EN LOS
PRIMEROS TIEMPOS DEL MUNDO ISLAMICO (Ana Marinez Vela trans., Universidad de Granada
ed.1998) (discussing agriculture in the early Islamic world); CARMEN TRILLO, AGUA, TIERRA
Y HOMBRES EN AL-ANDALUS (2004) (analyzing the social and economic structures in Muslim
Spain).
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water to promote economic growth in agrarian Spain while also
improving farmers' social conditions. A century ago, Joaquin Costa4
developed this philosophy and was heavily involved in gathering the
social impetus to bring about the early irrigation projects of the Canal de
Arag6n y Catalufia and Riegos del Alto Arag6n in the Ebro basin.5 The
key premise of this traditional supply approach was that water is a
plentiful resource to be developed by public and private agents.6
During the twentieth century in Spain, hydrological planning
was an important issue driven by this traditional supply approach. This
resulted in a succession of planning efforts, which included the Gasset
Plan of 1902, the National Plan of Hydrological Works in republican
Spain,7 the Development Plans of the industrialization period of the
1960s and 1970s, and the National Hydrological Plans of 19938 and 2001. 9
The 1933 National Plan of Hydrological Works together with the
Agrarian Reform Law of 1932 were important government initiatives of
the Spanish Republic aimed at modernizing the Spanish agricultural
sector. The Minister of Public Works, Indalecio Prieto, created the Center
of Hydrographic Studies under the direction of Lorenzo-Pardo and
charged it with the task of elaborating the National Plan of Hydrological
Works. The objectives of the Plan were to increase the nation's wealth
and farmers' income by expanding agricultural production and exports
through a 1.75 million hectare (ha) increase in irrigated acreage. The Plan
included 215 high priority dams, canals, and irrigation districts, 142 of
which had been completed by the end of the twentieth century.1°
The main project of the National Plan of Hydrological Works
was the Tajo-Segura water transfer to southeastern Spain (Figure 111), a
project strongly criticized by Felix de los Rios, director of the Ebro basin
4. JOAQUIN COSTA, POLITICA HIDRAULICA: (MISION SOCIAL DE LOS RIEGOS EN ESPAA)
(1911), available at http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/servlet/SirveObras/00258309899772
630757857/); JOAQUIN COSTA, LA TIERRA Y LA CUESTION SOCIAL (1912), available at http://
www.eumed.net/cursecon/textos/costa/index.htm.
5. JUAN A. BOLEA-FORADADA, LOS RIEGOS DE ARAGON (Grupo Parlamentario
Aragon~s Regionalista de las Cortes de Arag6n eds. 1986).
6. Jos( Carles & Marta Garcia, La Coherencia de las Instituciones y los Modelos de Uso del
Agua, in LOS INSTRUMENTOS ECONOMICOS EN LA GESTION DEL AGUA EN LA AGRICULTURA
115, 117 (Jose Albiac ed., 2003).
7. MANUEL LORENZO-PARDO, PLAN NACIONAL DE OBRAS HIDRAULiCAS (1933).
8. DIRECCION GENERAL DE OBRAS HIDRAULIcAs, MINISrERIO DE OBRAS POBLICAS Y
TRANSPORTES, ANTEPROYECTO DE LEY DELPLAN HIDROLOGicO NACIONAL (1993).
9. MINisTERIO DE MEDIO AMBIENTE, PLAN HIDROLOGIcO NACIONAL: ANALISIS DE LOS
SISTEMAS HIDRAULICOS (2000); MINISTERIO DE MEDIO AMBIENTE, PLAN HIDROLOGICO
NACIONAL: ANALISIS EcONOMICOS (2000) [hereinafter ANALISIS EcONOMIcOS].
10. Miguel Arenillas Parra, El Plan Nacional de Obras Hidrdulicas Sesenta Anos Despuis,
in PLAN NACIONAL DE OBRAS HIDRAuLIcAs CVII, CXI (Juan de Zumnrraga ed., 1993).
11. LORENZO-PARDO, supra note 7.
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authority in 1933, who proposed the Ebro water transfer to southeastern
Spain as an alternative (Figure 212). In hindsight, de los Rios was correct
in criticizing the Tajo-Segura water transfer because the 1933 Plan's
estimated 760 cubic hectometers (hm3) of water available for diversion in
the upper Tajo was seriously overestimated. 3
The de los Rios proposal is the origin of the Ebro water transfer,
and this proposal resurfaced in the Second Economic and Social
Development Plan of 1968. The Development Plan considered two major
inter-basin water transfer projects: the Tajo-Segura project and the Ebro-
Jticar-Segura project, but ultimately only the Tajo-Segura transfer was
built during the 1970s. Miscalculation of water availability in the Tajo-
Segura water transfer and the huge expansion of irrigation in
southeastern Spain due to pervasive aquifer depletion led to the recent
proposals of water transfers from the Ebro during the past decade in
both the 1993 and 2001 National Hydrological Plans.
The National Hydrological Plan of 1993 was intended to
interconnect all the main basins of the Iberian Peninsula with huge
investments in waterworks.14 The amount of transferred water was
nearly 4,000 hm 3, with exports from the North, Duero, Tajo, and Ebro
donating basins, and imports by the Ebro, Tajo, Guadiana, Guadalquivir,
internal Catalufia, Jdcar, Segura, and Sur receiving basins.15 The extent of
investments required to interconnect all the basins and the large volume
of transfers caused controversy and were met with distrust by social and
political groups and by territories. There were also serious legal obstacles
because the Plan had less legal force than the Water Law of 1985, yet it
proposed many modifications to the Water Law. A consulting body, the
National Water Council, demanded a review of the planned expansion of
irrigated acreage (600,000 ha) and the planned increases in water
demands by each sector.
Finally, the Spanish Parliament decided in 1994 that the National
Hydrological Plan had to include estimates and conditions for the inter-
12. MINISTERIO DE OBRAS PBLICAS, PLAN GENERAL DE OBRAS PTBLIcAS. ToMo II OBRAS
HIDRAULICAS (1940).
13. This was demonstrated when the Tajo-Segura transfer was finally built in the 1970s
with a capacity of 1,000 hm3 because, since 1978, when the Tajo-Segura transfer became
operational, the average volume of water transferred each year has been only 330 hm3.
14. The investments of the 1993 Plan (Ministerio de Obras Pfiblicas y Transportes,
Informe sobre el Plan Hidrol6gico Nacional, 1993) were 28 billion euros, and the
investments of the 2001 Plan were 19 billion euros, of which 4.7 billion euros were
earmarked to build the Ebro water transfer.
15. Water exports per basin (in hm3) were North 200, Duero 1,050, Tajo 900, and Ebro
1,855; and water imports were Ebro 400, Tajo 850, Guadiana 170, Guadalquivir 100, internal
Catalufta 475, Jticar 700, Segura 1,205, and Sur 105.
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basin transfers, alternatives to the proposed water transfers, and budget
assessments for the transfer projects. The Plan also had to be coordinated
with a new National Irrigation Plan and with measures for water treat-
ment, water savings, and water reutilization. Two additional hurdles
were added when (1) the Senate introduced the requirement that all
hydrological basin plans had to be approved before the National
Hydrologic Plan was passed, and (2) all the representatives in the
National Water Council rejected the Plan. Ultimately, these social and
political factors triggered the collapse of the National Hydrological Plan
of 1993.16
From an academic perspective, Federico Aguilera-Klink 7 was
the first author in Spain to use economic arguments to challenge the
traditional supply expansion approach by discussing the National
Hydrological Plan of 1993 in a series of articles with Arturo Gonzilez-
Romero and Santiago Rubio.18 Gonzdlez-Romero and Rubio had
assumed that the costs of supplying and using water within basins were
zero, and that the only relevant costs were those of transporting water
between basins; therefore, profits from water arbitrage among basins
would force water trades through inter-basin transfers. In response to
Aguilera-Klink's comments, Rubio and Gonzalez' 9 conceded that there
could be an increasing cost curve of water in each basin, generating
positive water prices in "surplus" basins. They also acknowledged that
to evaluate the change in social welfare from water transfers, information
was needed regarding water supply and demand equilibrium prices for
each basin, and these prices had to be compared with the costs of
imported water.
The degradation of water resources in the semi-arid coastal areas
of the Segura and Sur basins deteriorated further during the 1990s. A
heavy increase in water demand from the highly profitable fruit and
vegetable sector, which included substantial greenhouse acreage,20
16. MINISRIO DE MEDIO AMBIENTE, LIBRO BLANCO DEL AGUA EN ESPANA 592-93
(2000).
17. Federico Aguilera-Klink, El problema de la planiflcaci6n hidrol6gica: una perspectiva
diferente, 2 REVISTA DE ECONOMIA APLICADA 209 (1993).
18. Arturo GonzAlez-Romero & Santiago J. Rubio, El problema de la planiflcaci6n
hidrol6gica: una aplicaci6n al caso espafiol, 1 REVISTA DE ECONOMlA APLICADA 33 (1993).
19. Santiago J. Rubio & Arturo Gonzdlez-Romero, El problema de la planificaci6n
hidrol6gica: un argumento econ6mico a favor de los trasvases, 2 REVISTA DE ECONOMIA APLICADA
217 (1993).
20. Remote sensing information indicates that irrigation acreage has more than tripled
in the Segura basin from 1970 to 1995, as measured by A. Quintanilla R6denas et al.,
Aproximaci6n al estudio de la evoluci6n temporal de la superficie en regadio de la cuenca del rio
Segura mediante tdcnicas de teledetecci6n y SIG, in TELEDETECCION 39, 43-45 (Jose L. Casanova
& Julia Sanz eds., 1997). In the Sur basin, greenhouse production started after 1970 and
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resulted in acute water scarcity and aquifer overdraft. Most of the water
demand increase was met by additional individual pumping by farmers
from aquifers that were not controlled by the water administration. The
government's solution was to undertake a new water planning effort,
this time based on a unique inter-basin transfer bringing water from the
Ebro to the Jficar, Segura, and Sur basins.
This article analyzes this last Ebro inter-basin transfer proposal,
which was the main project of the National Hydrological Plan of 2001.
The transfer was designed to solve the severe degradation of
southeastern Jficar, Segura, and Sur basins by transferring 820 hm3 from
the Ebro basin a distance of up to 750 km.21 The analysis considers the
key tasks raised by Aguilera-Klink a decade ago and focuses on the costs
of alternatives to the Ebro transfer and the response of demand to water
prices. These important tasks were ignored by the Spanish water
authority administration in the design of the Ebro water transfer project.
The Ebro transfer faced strong opposition from water resource
experts, environmental and social organizations, and the Arag6n and
Catalufia states located in the Ebro basin.22 The primary argument
against the transfer was that the traditional approach of augmenting
supply to deal with water scarcity was obsolete and that new water
management policy initiatives were needed. These policy initiatives had
to be based on reasonable management measures, such as water pricing,
revision of water concessions, abstraction limits on surface and
subsurface waters, development of regulated water markets, new supply
technologies (e.g., desalination), water quality protection, and reuse and
regeneration of water resources.
Another blow to the Ebro transfer was the reluctance of the
European Union (EU) to provide funding for the project because of its
shaky economic and environmental foundation. The Ebro transfer was at
acreage has expanded to around 30,000 ha (Table 1). Remote sensing images comparing
Campo Dalias greenhouses between 1974 and 2000 are presented in U.N. ENV'T PROGRAM,
ONE PLANET, MANY PEOPLE: ATLAS OF OUR CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 200-01 (2005),
available at www.na.unep.net/OnePlanetManyPeople/AtlasDownload/UNEP-Atlas/Atlas
_3-5-Cropland_Screen.pdf.
21. An additional volume of 200 hm3 was planned to be sent 180 km north to Barcelona
(Figure 3).
22. Economic and environmental arguments on the transfer can be found at www.
mma.es/agua/informes.htm, with the opinions of a large number of experts. A
comprehensive assessment of the degradation of the Ebro Delta and the fluvial and marine
ecosystems as a result of the inter-basin transfer can be found in CARLES IBAIEZ & NARcIS
PRAT, The Environmental Impact of the Spanish National Hydrological Plan on the Lower Ebro
River and Delta, 19 INT'L J. WATER RESOURcEs DEv. 485 (2003), and in NARcis PRAT &
CARLES IBANEz, AVALUACIO CR-TICA DEL PLAN HIDROLCGIC NACIONAL I PROPOSTA PER A
UNA GEsTIO SOSTENIBLE DE L'AIGUA DEL BAIX EBRE (2003).
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odds with the EU policies of the 2000 Water Framework Directive, which
adopted a new water policy based on the management of demand, full
recovery costs including environmental costs, and the establishment of
standards on water flows, emission loads, and ambient pollution levels.
The directive promotes the use of economic tools instead of increasing
the availability of water resources in order to avoid mismanagement and
reduce environmental degradation. Pursuant to the directive, the
economic cost of water must be considered as an indicator of water
scarcity, and at least a reasonable part of water costs should be recovered
from users.
Finally, the Ebro water transfer was cancelled in 2005 by the new
Spanish Parliament after the former government lost the 2004 elections.
The current policy of the Spanish central government to solve the severe
degradation of water resources in the southeastern basins is the AGUA
project.23 The AGUA project is designed to replace the Ebro transfer, and
the main thrust of the project is to augment water supply with seawater
desalination.
The Shortcomings of the Ebro Project
The documentation of the National Hydrological Plan of 200124
presents the economic and environmental analysis of the Ebro transfer
project. Because the analysis adopted an engineering economics
approach, following the traditional planning of the Spanish water
administration, there were some critically important theoretical and
empirical shortcomings in the economic analysis. Alternative levels of
supply augmentation were not considered and the amount of water
needed in the receiving area was taken as a fixed and given quantity. The
basis for the municipal and industrial component of this quantity was
explained by some projections of population and per capita water use,
but no economic justification was provided for the remaining 561 hm 3
targeted for agriculture and intended to cover the elimination of aquifer
overdraft (419 hm3) and to guarantee supply reliability (142 hm3). The
23. The official Spanish name for the Project is "Programa A.G.U.A." (Actuaciones
para la Gesti6n y la Utilizaci6n del Agua).
24. See MINISTERIO DE MEDio AMBIENTE, EVALUACION AMBIENTAL ESTRATIGICA DEL
PLAN HIDROLOGICO NACIONAL (2002); see also SOCIEDAD ESTATAL TRASAGUA
INFRAESTRUCTURAS DEL TRASVASE, S.A. & MINISTERIO DE MEDIO AMBIENTE, MEMORIA DEL
PROYECTO DE LAS TRANSFERENCIAS AUTORIZADAS POR EL ART!CULO 13 DE LA LEY 10/ 2001 DE
5 DE JULIO (PLAN HIDROLOGIco NACIONAL) Y su ESTUDIO DE IMPAcTO AMBIENTAL (2003); see
generally MINISTERIO DE MEDIO AMBIENTE, supra note 9 (citing to both the hydraulic system
and the economic analysis documents).
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analytical foundation for the determination of these specific quantities is
flimsy and unconvincing.
The majority of the water transferred would go to agricultural
uses, with the agricultural benefits calculated as the average value
product of the water, estimated at 0.75 E/m 3. However, the correct
benefit measure of the incremental water supply in the receiving areas is
the marginal value of water, in order to calculate the profit loss that is
avoided by importing transferred water. By using the average value of
water, the project makes two heroic assumptions: that profits are
exclusively a return to water and that the average value is constant and
not declining with the amount of water. Because of the possibility of
changing the crop mixes and the varying land quality, the marginal
profit loss from reducing water is likely to be well below this 0.75 E/m 3
average value of water.
The type of analysis used in the Ebro project, known as an
"ability to pay analysis," has been found in the United States to be highly
unreliable for predicting demand for project water and consistently
overstates this demand.25 The shortfalls in demand forced project
managers to charge prices to agricultural users that were well below the
estimated ability to pay both in the Central Valley Project in California
and, most recently, in the Central Arizona Project.26 Because farmers'
actual willingness to pay turned out to be substantially less than the
estimates of their ability to pay, these and many other federal water
projects have consistently failed to recover their costs. In the United
States over the past century, the federal government spent 21.8 billion
dollars on 133 water projects in the western states, of which 7.1 billion
dollars was allocated to be paid by irrigation users; at present, less than
one billion dollars of this cost has been repaid.
There are two further omissions in the economic analysis of the
Ebro project. One is the failure to allow for the uncertainty in estimating
future costs and benefits of project water, especially in the agricultural
sector, which is vulnerable to potential future changes in EU agricultural
and trade policies, changes in the continued availability of inexpensive
foreign labor, and changes in energy prices. There is also no allowance
for the potential future effects of climate change. The second omission of
25. See, e.g., RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (1989); Paul N. Wilson, Economic Discovery in
Federally Supported Irrigation Districts: A Tribute to William E. Martin and Friends, 22 J. AGRIC.
& RESOURCE ECON. 61 (1997).
26. W. Michael Hanemann, The Central Arizona Project (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Dep't of
Agric. & Resource Econ. & Pol'y, Working Paper No. 937, 2002), available at http://are.
berkeley.edu/%7Ehanemann/cap.pdf.
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the economic analysis is the lack of an explicit economic evaluation of
the project's environmental impacts, both negative and positive. The
project includes a small charge (0.03 E/m 3) to compensate for the
negative environmental impacts within the Ebro basin, but this amount
is arbitrary and not based on any systematic assessment of the
environmental impacts and their non-market valuation. Experience
worldwide indicates that the improvement of environmental conditions
can generate significant economic benefits associated with recreation,
eco-tourism, and the non-use value of ecosystem protection, which could
outweigh the benefits from agricultural or even urban water use.27
The analysis presented below addresses some of the
shortcomings in the economic analysis of the Ebro transfer project. The
focus is on the agricultural benefits in order to examine both the water
demand response in the southeastern basins and the marginal value of
water in each county of these basins. Several demand and supply water
policy alternatives to the Ebro transfer are examined and a very
important issue in order to evaluate the water policy alternatives is the
response of irrigation to water prices. The findings show that
compromise solutions incorporating both water supply and demand
management measures should be considered. These compromise
solutions combine the reduction of water demand and the increase of
water supply through desalination. The reduction in water demand
could be achieved by water pricing or by water markets coupled with
rationing the resource.
The article is structured as follows: first, the analytical setting is
presented, with a description of the methodology and the technical and
economic data used and including information on water rights and
water trading in the area. This is followed with the results of the
simulation of water demand management alternatives and water supply
expansion alternatives. The conclusions of the research are presented in
the final section.
27. In the Mono Lake decision in California, the diversion from Mono Lake was
reduced by two thirds, despite the loss of hydropower and water supply to Los Angeles, in
order to protect wildlife habitat. This is an example of non-use values associated with
habitat protection as being the main components of environmental benefits. See Thomas
Wegge, W. Michael Hanemann & John Loomis, Comparing Benefits and Costs of Water
Resource Allocation Policies for California's Mono Basin, in 1 ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMICS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES 11, 14-21 (Darwin C. Hall ed., 1996).
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Table 1. Acreage, Water Use, and Revenue in Southeastern Basins (2001)
Cereals, Open air Greenhouse
Basins Total alfalfa, and Fruit trees Opetair getabls
sunflower vegetables vegetables
Icar
Acreage (1,000 ha) 212.7 18.5 173.6 19.5 1.1
Irrigation water 1,450 242 1,081 121 6(hm3)
Revenue (mllion C) 1,196 39 957 167 33
Segura
Acreage (1,000 ha) 154.8 7.2 115.9 26.8 4.9
Irrigation water 863 49 710 82 22
(hm 3)
Revenue (million C) 1,070 5 558 264 243
Sur
Acreage (1,000 ha) 54.5 1.1 18.7 6.5 28.1
Irrigation water 232 10 96 24 102
(hm3)
Revenue (million E) 1,124 1 67 87 969
ALTERNATIVES TO THE EBRO PROJECT
The alternatives to the Ebro project are evaluated with a linear
programming model that incorporates a large quantity of technical and
economic information specified at the county level. The model is used to
simulate several water supply and demand policy scenarios. 28 The model
covers the southeastern counties of the Iberian Peninsula that receive
water from the Ebro transfer (Figure 329). There are 22 counties in the
Comunidad Valenciana, six counties in the Comunidad de Murcia, and
seven counties in Almeria. The year of reference for all technical and
economic data is 2001, and the baseline data on acreage, water use, and
revenue are presented in Table 1.
28. Details of the model building, parameter estimation, and simulation results are
presented in Jos6 Albiac et al., Evaluating Alternatives to the Spanish National Hydrological
Plan (CITA-DGA Working Paper No. 04/04, 2004); Jos6 Albiac Murillo et al., El uso agrario
del agua en las comarcas de Levante y del Sureste y el trasvase del Ebro, 196 REViSTA ESPAI&OLA
DE EsTuDIos AGROSOCIALES Y PESQUEROS 95 (2002); Jos6 Albiac et al., The Economic
Unsustainability of the Spanish National Hydrological Plan, 19 INTL J. WATER RESOURCES DEV.
437 (2003); Grupo de Economia del Medio Ambiente y recursos Naturales, Plan
Hidrol6gico Nacional, www.unizar.es/econatura/phn.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2006)
(archiving the databases of the study).
29. For the latest water transfer path, see SOCIEDAD ESTATAL TRASAGUA
INFRAESTRUCTURAS DEL TRASVASE, S.A. & MINISTERIO DE MEDIO AMBIENTE, supra note 24.
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Crop cost data come from the Government of Murcia,30 the
Ministry of Agriculture,31 and other monographic studies. Quasi-rent or
net income for each crop is calculated by subtracting direct costs,
machinery and paid labor, and indirect costs and depreciation from
gross revenue. Other coefficients are calculated from official statistical
sources, such as municipal crop acreage or yield data, or elaborated from
more than one source, as in the case of water availability by county,
which is estimated from meteorological data and technical data from
research institutes in Valencia, Murcia, and Andalucia. Water
consumption for each crop is obtained by multiplying the water
requirement per hectare by the acreage covered by the crop in the
county. 32
The objective function maximizes quasi-rent of irrigated
cultivation activities, where the county is the decision unit. The
constraints represent land, water, and labor resource availability.
Irrigation acreage is defined for each type of crop and irrigation
technology, and crops include fruits, vegetables, and cereals and alfalfa.
Substitution among vegetables is allowed in the vegetable acreage, and
substitution among cereals and alfalfa is allowed in the cereal acreage,
but the fruit-tree acreage is held constant for each species.33 The linear
program for each county includes around 80 crop activities and 60
resource constraints. Resource constraints include 22 soil constraints and
monthly water and labor constraints.
30. AMOPA, GOBIERNO DE MURCIA, ESTUDOO GENERAL DE LA ESTRUCTURA Y BALANCE
AGRONOMICO Y ECONOMICO DE LAs EXPLOTACIONEs AGRICOLAS DE LA REGION DE MURCIA
(2000).
31. MIISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA, PESCA Y ALIMENTACION, ANALISIS DE LA ECONOMIA
DE LOS SISTEMAS DE PRODUCCION: RESULTADOS TICNICO-ECONOMICOS DE EXPLOTACIONES
HORTOFRUTCOLAS DE LA COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA EN 2001 (2002).
32. Gross water requirement of a crop is equal to net water requirement divided by the
irrigation system efficiency (0.6 for surface irrigation and 0.9 for drip irrigation), and net
water requirement is equal to the crop evapotranspiration less precipitation. Crop
evapotranspiration is calculated from county meteorological data and crop coefficients K,.
See ANTONIO MARTINEZ COB ET AL., EVAPOTRANSPIRACION Y NECESIDADES DE RIEGO DE LOS
PRINCIPALES CULTIVOS EN LAS COMARCAS DE ARAGON (1998). See also RICHARD G. ALLEN ET
AL., CROP EVAPOTRANSPIRATION-GUIDELINES FOR COMPUTING CROP WATER REQUIREMENTS
(1998) (providing the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization recommendations upon
which the calculation is based).
33. See, e.g., Bruce A. McCarl, Cropping Activities in Agricultural Sector Models: A
Methodological Proposal, 64 AM. J. AGRIc. ECON. 768 (1982) (suggesting a procedure to solve
the aggregation problem). See also Hayri Onal & Bruce A. McCarl, Aggregation of
Heterogeneous Firms in Mathematical Programming Models, 16 EUR. J. AGRIC. ECON. 499 (1989);
Hayri Onal & Bruce A. McCarl, Exact Aggregation in Mathematical Programming Sector
Models, 39 CAN. J. AGRIC. ECON. 319 (1991).
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Table 2. Energy Consumption of the Ebro Transfer at Each Destination
The costs of the Ebro project at each delivery location have been
calculated by Uche. 34 The energy costs of pumping are an important cost
component of the transfer project, and the specific energy consumption
at each section is closely related to the elevation of the channel (Table 2).
The investment costs of the transfer project have been calculated by
applying the methodology used in the project,35 although some
discrepancies have been detected and included in the costs. Table 3
shows the costs of diverted Ebro water by county. Costs of diverted
water are lower than seawater desalination (0.52 /m 3) up to Costera
and Vail d'Albaida counties, but desalination costs beyond these
counties are lower than transfer costs, and transfer costs in Almeria
double desalination costs.
Water Rights and Informal Water Trading in Southeastern Basins
One of the alternatives being considered to solve water scarcity
in the area is water trading, and the assessment of the present situation
of water rights and water exchanges is important for developing
regulated water markets. This section describes Spanish water law and
34. Javier Uche Marcuello, Anejo 2. Andlisis de los costes del Proyecto de Transferencias, in
Alegaciones al Proyecto de Transferencias Autorizadas por la Ley del Plan Hidrol6gico Nacional y
Estudio de Impacto Ambiental (J. Albiac ed., CITA-DGA Working Paper 03/03, 2003).
35. ANAiLsis ECON6MICOS, supra note 9.
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explains water rights and the informal water trading presently taking
place in the southeastern basins.
The basic law regulating water management in Spain is the 1985
Water Act,36 which was partly amended in 1999.37 Both acts were
consolidated in 200138 and this legislation has been adapted to the Water
Framework Directive of the European Union.39 In addition to these laws,
water management is also affected by related legislation for the
regulation of public works, water pollution, or wastewater treatment.
The key principle of the 1985 Water Act is that all continental
water, either surface or ground water, is of the public domain, with some
exceptions for ground water. There are no water rights in the strict sense
but rather temporary public concessions that grant the holder the right to
use a given amount of water. These concessions can be cancelled and
reallocated to other users by the basin authority in the event of
inadequate or unjustified use of water. This rarely occurs in practice,
however.
The Spanish Water Act grants an important role to public
administration. Each basin authority (known in each basin as the
Confederaci6n Hidrogrdfica) is the main administrative body responsible
for water management at the basin level. They are responsible for the
elaboration and monitoring of the basin hydrological plan, the
administration and control of the water public domain, and all water
uses. The Confederaciones Hidrogrdficas are in charge of projects,
construction works, and the management of public hydraulic works,
which may be financed by the central or state governments, local
councils, or even private entities. The basin hydrological plans are
integrated in the National Hydrological Plan approved by the central
government. According to the Spanish Water Act, the objectives of
hydrological planning are to satisfy all water demands, to attain an
equilibrated and harmonious water sector, and to further regional
development. This is achieved by increasing resource availability and
maintaining water quality and by rational and sustainable usage.
Another important feature of the Spanish water legislation is the
key role given to water users, especially to those in agriculture. Article 73
of the 1985 Water Act establishes that users relying on water from a
single common concession must create a water users association, or
comunidad de regantes for agricultural users. Agricultural water users
associations have their own equity and legal status and are ruled by
36. Ley de Aguas (B.O.E. 1985,189,243) (Spain).
37. Ley de modificaci6n de la Ley de Aguas (B.O.E. 1999, 298) (Spain).
38. Ley de Aguas (B.O.E. 2001,176) (Spain).
39. Council Directive 2000/60, EU Water Framework Directive, 2000 O.J. (L 327) (EC).
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statutes approved by the users' assembly and the basin authority. They
are self-financed from the levies paid by their members. These
associations are in charge of the main issues relating to irrigation water
use, such as organizing irrigation turns, controlling water allocation and
consumption, collecting water fees, investing in the modernization of
irrigation systems, and exchanging or leasing water with other users.
The Spanish legislation therefore establishes a certain level of
decentralization in water management. The basin authority is in charge
of the main waterworks in the basin and is responsible for resource
allocation through public concessions, while water users associations are
responsible for the management of secondary infrastructures and the
allocation of water among members.
Regarding the water pricing policy, Articles 112 to 114 of the
1985 Water Act establish four levies that are collected by the basin
authority.4° The first is a levy on users occupying or making use of the
public hydraulic domain, charging for the use of land and river beds.
The second levy is a discharge fee on authorized effluents released into
water bodies belonging to the public domain. These two fees aim to
protect and improve the state of the public hydraulic domain. The third
levy, known as the "regulation fee," is paid by all beneficiaries of public
waterworks that regulate runoffs and waterways. The fourth fee is the
"water use tariff" on water consumption, paid by users that benefit from
specific infrastructures. Both the "regulation levy" and the "water use
tariff" aim to cover public operation and maintenance costs and part of
the public investment costs.
Individual users pay fees directly to the basin authority. Farmers
in water users associations pay the "regulation levy" and the "water use
tariff" through their irrigation district, plus an additional tariff to cover
costs of the irrigation district itself. Water users associations that abstract
water directly without using public waterworks pay only the regulation
levy.
The 1999 reform of the Water Act introduced the legal possibility
of voluntary water exchanges, but with many restrictions. This reform
acknowledged the limitations of the traditional supply-side policies by
timidly encouraging temporary exchanges of water use rights. The
public nature of water is upheld and only the right to use it is leased for
a limited period of time. The Spanish water law envisions two ways to
exchange public water concessions. The first is that concession holders
may privately agree on specific terms for exchanging water use rights.
40. ALBERTO GARRIDO & JAVIER CALATRAVA, Recent and Future Trends in Water Charging
and Water Markets, in WATER POLICY IN SPAIN (A. Garrido & M. Ram6n Llamas eds.,
forthcoming 2007).
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The second is that there are legislative provisions for launching "water
exchange centers" (bancos de agua) that would be brokered by the basin
authority to speed up transfers during shortages and to disseminate
information regarding water transactions and prices. In both cases, the
basin authority must approve water exchanges and take into account
impacts on third parties. There are other stringent requirements, such as
previously holding a public concession in order to participate in the
market as a buyer. Water exchanges among different basins are also
allowed, provided that water transfer facilities are in place and that
exchanges are permitted by the National Hydrological Plan.
Up to 1985, most surface water resources were public as
established in the Water Act of 1866, while the Water Act of 1879
recognized the ownership of ground water by private individuals or
companies pumping the resource. The heavy public funding allocated
for the development of surface water resources justified this dual legal
treatment. During the twentieth century, development of collective
irrigation systems based on public water works expanded irrigation
from 1.0 to 2.5 million ha.
After 1960, there was a large escalation in groundwater
extractions driven by the falling costs of pumping technologies in areas
with profitable irrigated crops, groundwater irrigation being at present
close to 1.0 million ha.41 Prior to 1985, these private groundwater
extractions were not controlled by the water administration, and the
need for government control over groundwater resources led to the 1985
Water Act declaring all surface and subsurface water public domain.
Holders of private rights over ground water were given the choice of
either keeping their rights or exchanging them for temporal water
concessions. Obviously the vast majority, over 80 percent of right
holders, have maintained their private rights.42
Surface water in southeastern basins is allocated in the form of
public concessions to local water agencies and irrigation user
associations, while privately owned or public domain ground water is
managed by local companies rather than individuals. In the Jficar and
Segura basins, ground water accounts for almost half of the irrigation
water, most of it supplied by privately owned water rights.43 The
41. Water demand in the 1.0 million ha under groundwater irrigation is close to 5,000
hm3, while water demand in the 2.5 million ha under surface irrigation is 19,000 hm3.
Almost half of the acreage under groundwater irrigation is located in the southeastern
basins 0icar, Segura, and Sur).
42. M. RAMON LLAMAS ET AL., AGUAS SUBTERRANEAS: RETOS Y OPORTUNIDADES (2001).
43. Jost CARLES GENOVtS, MARTA GARcIA MOLLA & LLOREN; AVELLA REUS, Aspectos
econ6micos y sociales de la utilizaci6n del agua subterrdnea en la Comunidad Valenciana, in LA
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development and management of private wells by irrigation companies
is common in both basins, although in the Segura basin many irrigation
districts have public entitlements over both surface and ground water. In
the Sur basin, private water rights are widespread in the province of
Almeria because ground water prevails over surface water. These private
water rights are owned by irrigation user associations, private
companies, or cooperatives.
Informal water trading is quite common in southeastern basins,
with spot exchanges predominating over occasional trading of water
rights. Water exchanges usually take place at the local level, depending
on water transportation facilities. Private companies, individual farmers,
or landowners who own wells sell water regularly to individual
irrigators, irrigation districts, industries, and urban water companies.
Some irrigation districts in Alicante auction their water allotment to
farmers, albeit with a limit on the amount of water for which an
individual farmer is allowed to bid.44
Public water concessions to irrigation user associations are
linked to the land as a rule. Private water rights, on the other hand, are
normally based on participation of users in a private company and
entitle users to a certain amount of water regardless of how much land
they own. The very limited trading of water rights that takes place in the
basins involves private rights to ground water.
Informal water trading goes on between farmers belonging to
the same irrigation district. This includes exchanges of water supplied by
the district and water from private wells owned by irrigators in the
district. In years of regular water supply, prices range between 0.10 and
0.40 
€/m 3 with an average around 0.15 f/m 3, although prices increase
during periods of water scarcity. Ground water is commonly priced
higher than surface water. Average agricultural water tariffs by county,
shown in Table 3, are somewhat below groundwater prices and water
trading prices. Water exchanges also take place among farmers without
any monetary transactions, based on customary trust among local
farmers.
Many illegal so-called drought wells are used mainly in dry
years. Some of them belong to irrigation districts, but many others
belong to individual farmers or landowners who sell the water. To
obtain additional water, farmers buy agricultural land sometimes as far
as 100 kilometers upstream and use the water in downstream farms
ECONOMA DEL AGUA SUBTERRANEA Y SU GESTION COLECIVA 153 (N. Hernndez-Mora & R.
Llamas eds., 2001).
44. Jost MARIA SUMPSI ET AL., ECONOMIA Y POLITICA DE GESTION DEL AGUA EN LA
AGRicULTURA (1998).
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where water is scarcer and more valuable.45 Environmental associations
claim that these practices often conceal illegal water sales to either
agricultural or urban users. They have also reported illegal water rights
transactions between irrigation districts and urban developers and water
companies.
The 1999 Water Law reform was aimed at facilitating water
exchanges, but it has not spurred the creation of water markets or further
water exchanges in southeastern basins where scarcity is widespread.46
The reason behind this is that farmers prefer the status quo, relying as
indicated above on public management of water at the basin level and
decentralized management by water users associations in irrigation
districts. Formal water markets, even public water banks, are met with
profound distrust by farmers. Despite the fact that these areas could
benefit significantly from establishing formal water markets among
districts, the general belief is that they would spread corruption and
result in water resources mismanagement. Farmers appear to disregard
the market potential to improve welfare and distrust markets that might
lead to the introduction of new or higher taxes on water or pollution
once public monitoring of water exchanges comes into operation.
Farmers are reluctant to admit their willingness to sell water because
they fear that such a disclosure would suggest that they do not really
need the water.
Water Management Scenarios
The model representing the irrigated agriculture in southeastern
basins has been used to assess the effects of several water management
alternatives. Two of these involve water demand management measures,
another two involve measures to increase water supply, and the last is a
combined management alternative. In the first scenario, a strategy is
analyzed in which groundwater overdraft is forbidden and there are no
transfers of water from external basins. In the second scenario, a price
increase is considered to reach a price level that balances water demand
with available water resources in southeastern basins. 47 This scenario
45. The areas of origin are usually the upper Segura and Vinalop6 rivers, using the
water in the middle and lower Vinalop6 and Segura rivers, and in Campo de Cartagena
county.
46. The main water supplier in the Segura basin (Mancomunidad de Canales del Taibilla)
placed offers in spring 2004 to buy water rights from agricultural users, but so far no
irrigation districts have accepted such bids. In 2004, the Segura basin authority also
approved the creation of a public water exchange center.
47. Baseline 2001 water prices for each county have been estimated from several
sources. See, e.g., Jost CARLES GENovPs, LORENZO AVELLA REUS & MARTA GARCIA MOLLA,
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follows the full recovery cost principle of the European Water
Framework Directive of 2000. The third alternative involves seawater
desalination. The fourth alternative is to expand water supply with
transferred water from the Ebro project, with water subsidies to maintain
the low water prices that farmers currently pay. The fifth alternative
combines seawater desalination and water trading among counties, with
a prohibition on aquifer overdraft. Water trades may take place along
current conveying facilities of main rivers and canals, allowing for an
additional supply of desalinated water. Desalinated water is only
considered as an option in coastal counties that exhibit a very high
marginal value of water, called "shadow price" in economic jargon.
Elimination of Groundwater Overdraft
Banning aquifer overdraft reduces the availability of water for
agriculture, the effects of which are concentrated in the counties where
the aquifers are located. 48 While in the JWcar and Segura basins the
reduction of available water and cultivated acreage mainly affects low
profit crops, in the Sur basin the reduction of water and cultivated
acreage affects highly profitable crops, since there are few low profit
crops to be abandoned (see Table 1). Losses are quite substantial in the
Sur basin, where farmers' revenue and quasi-rent fall by almost 50
percent, while in Segura they decline by 20 percent and in JCicar by less
than ten percent. More than 60 percent of losses in quasi-rent, that is 261
million C of 408 in losses, occur in the Sur basin due to the abandonment
of highly profitable greenhouse crops.
The quantity of water from the Ebro transfer project targeted to
solve groundwater overdraft in the Sur basin is only 58 hm3; this is
insufficient to offset the current overdraft, which amounts to 71 hm3. The
proposed Ebro transfers into the Jicar and Segura basins, by contrast, are
much more generous. Therefore, the Ebro transfer will not solve the
aquifer overdraft in Almeria.
The ban on groundwater overdraft should be combined with
additional management measures, such as water trading between
counties in the Sur, Segura, and Jdicar basins in order to minimize losses
to farmers. This alternative is examined at the end of this section.
PREcIOs, cOsTEs Y USO DEL AGUA EN EL REGADO MED'rERRANEO (1998) (a reliable source,
although, it has not been followed in all instances).
48. This measure would be difficult to implement by the administration because many
wells are not registered, the volume of abstractions is not known, and there is a
considerable number of illegal wells.
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Table 3. Water Demand and Prices in Southeastern Basins, by ounty
Water Prices of Water Value of water
County Use (fIM3) (f/M3)(hm3) (/3 /3
Marginal
u osts of water ater Average Average value
Current from Ebro desalination revenue quasi- of water
transfer rent (shadow
price)
Baix Maestrat 21 0.09 0.20 1.8 0.81 0.3
Plana Alta 41 0.0 0.23 1.4 0.67 0.4
Plana Baixa 121 0.0 0.29 1. 0. 0.5
Camp de Morvedre 4N 0.A 0.30 0.9 0.46 0.34
Camp de Turia 121 0.0 0.31 0.9 0.45 0.0
Horta Nord 5C 0.0 0.31 0.8A 0.37 0.1N
Valencia 2- 0.0 0.32 0. 0.2 0.1
Hoya de Bunyol 1A 0.00 0.32 1.0 0.6 0.1
Horta Oest 31 0.0N 0.32 0.81 0.38 0.16
Horta Sud 61 0.0 0.33 0.60 0.33 0.19
Ribera Alta 27A 0.0 0.31 0.6N 0.34 0.31
Ribera Baixa 22A 0.00 0.35 0.32 0.18 0.15
Safor 9 0.00 0.40 0.52 0.83 0. 0.37
Vail d'Albaida 1A 0.00 0.0 1.42 0. 0.141
Costera 31 0.0 0.40 1.01 0.4 0.25
Marina Alta 4A 0.0 0.5 0.52 1.04 0.51 0.34
Marina Baixa 1A 0.1A 0.5 0.52 0. 0.4 0.21
Alacanti 2A 0.1 0. 0.52 1.54 0.80 0.14
Alt Vinalop6 3A 0.1A 0.5N 0.31 0.17 0.1!
Vinalop6 Mitja 6 0.11 0.50 1.10 0.67 0.2
Baix Vinalop6 51 0.1A 0.57 0.52 0.61 0.30 0.1'
Baix Segura 24A 0.1A 0.57 0.52 0.7 0.37 0.16
Noreste 5A 0.1A 0.72 0.93 0.53 0.21
Vega del Segura 273 0.1A 0.57 0.71 0.42 0.24
Centro 2 0.0 0.57 0.8 0.44 0.18
Noroeste 41 0.0 0.57 0.81 0.43 0.11
Campo de Cartagena 64 0.1A 0.61 0.52 3.1A 1.40 0.19
Valle del Guadalentin 163 0.1A 0.6A 0.52 2.21 1.141 0.19
Bajo Almanzora 33 0.15 0.7N 0.52 3.61 2.01 0.23
Alto Almanzora 34 0.06 0.9A 0.6 0.2 0.08
Campo Tabernas 20 0.06 0.91 0.66 0.3( 0.07
Rio Nacimiento 11 0.06 1.05 0.72 0.2 0.13
Campo Nfjar-Bajo 47 0.18 1.05 0.52 6.22 3.52 0.29
Andarax I I
Alto Andarax 16 0. 1.05 1.11 0.4 0.1
Campo Dallas 7A 0.21 1.05 0.51 9.1 4.5q 3.41
Increasing Water Prices
An increase in water prices for irrigation is a demand
management instrument advocated by the EU Water Framework
Directive. Current agricultural water prices range between 0.06 and 0.21
C/m 3 in southeastern counties (see Table 3). Since these water prices are
below the marginal value of water (or shadow price), the result is a
rationed market where demand exceeds supply. Water scarcity could be
reduced by increasing prices, and the price increases considered are 0.12
and 0.18 E/m 3 .
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An increase of 0.12 €/m 3 in water prices reduces agricultural
water demand by 509 hm3, with a three percent fall in revenue and a 17
percent fall in quasi-rent due to the reduction in the acreage of cereal and
woody crops, which are less profitable. The impact on quasi-rent is much
greater in the Jficar and Segura basins, where crops are less profitable,
than in Almeria, where there is substantial greenhouse acreage. The 509
hm3 reduction in water demand is close to the 561 hm3 agricultural
allotment from the Ebro water transfer project. The annual loss of 287
million C in quasi-rent is a measure of the compensation that could be
offered as an incentive to farmers to voluntarily accept this increase in
water prices (see Tables 4 and 5).
An increase of 0.18 C/m 3 in water prices reduces water demand
by 605 hm3, with a four percent decline in revenue and a 24 percent drop
in quasi-rent. The decline in quasi-rent is more pronounced in the Jficar
and Segura basins because of the reduction of less profitable cereal and
woody crops. The 605 hm3 contraction in water demand is not much less
than the 820 hm3 total of transferred water from the Ebro to the three
basins for urban, industrial, and agricultural uses. The remaining excess
demand could be covered by water trading between counties or by
seawater desalination. The costs of this 0.18 E/m 3 price increase, which
amounts to 405 million E, equal the farmers' quasi-rent losses. This
would be the compensation required to ensure that farmers voluntarily
accept the price increase.
The 0.12 f/m 3 or 0.18 f/m 3 water price increases, coupled with
seawater desalination or water trading, solve the water shortage by
balancing supply and demand while avoiding the huge investment
required for the Ebro transfer. To implement this water pricing
alternative, higher prices must be charged for both surface and
subsurface water. Enforcement of higher prices would be straight-
forward for surface water, which is already controlled both by irrigation
user associations at the district level and the water administration at the
basin level. Enforcement would be quite difficult to implement on
individual aquifer abstractions, however, because there are no irrigation
water associations, nor does the basin authority have information on and
effective control of aquifers.
Desalination
Desalination of seawater is a supply measure that can be used to
complement water management measures such as water pricing or
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water markets. The cost of desalination is 0.52 E/m 3,4 9 which is less than
the costs of transferred water in the counties south of Safor (see Table 3).
Effective water demand at desalination cost (that is, water demand able
to pay the 0.52 (/m 3 desalination price) is 387 hm3 in the coastal counties
from Safor to Campo Dalfas.50 Desalination increases supply and may
contribute to balancing water demand and supply in southeastern
basins. This balance could be achieved with 387 hm3 supplied by
desalination coupled with a 509 hm3 reduction in demand driven by the
0.12 E/m 3 water price increase. This results in a total of 896 hm3, which is
above the Ebro water transfer allocation of 820 hm3 for all uses.
Transferring Water from the Ebro
This is the Ebro project alternative featured in the National
Hydrological Plan of 2001, which was cancelled by the Spanish
Parliament in 2005. Diverted water would involve high costs depending
on the distance from the Ebro river, with prices ranging between 0.20
E/m 3 and 1.05 E/m 3. These are well above the low prices in the 0.06 to
0.21 E/m 3 range that farmers currently pay (see Table 3) and at these
prices the project water will only pay for itself in counties with highly
profitable crops.
The volume of imported water that counties can absorb at the
prices shown in Figure 2 is 761 hm3 in Jficar, 294 hm 3 in Segura, and 132
hm3 in Sur. These quantities contrast with the planned water transfer
targets for agricultural and environmental use of 141 hm3 in Jflcar, 362
hm3 in Segura, and 58 hm 3 in Sur (see Table 4). Thus, there is a
significant inconsistency in the proposed transfer project for the Segura
basin, which can absorb only 294 hm3 of water for agricultural use at the
water transfer price, compared with the 362 hmn3 for agricultural use
allocated by the Ebro project. Farmers in Segura would not be willing to
pay for a quantity of imported project water equal to the amount now
being overdrawn, which means that overdrafting will persist.
The former central Spanish government asserted that farmers in
the receiving basins would pay for Ebro water at the same price they are
currently paying. Its intention, therefore, was to remove the
inconsistency in transfer allocation targets by subsidizing the price of
transferred water allocated to agriculture and charging higher prices to
urban and industrial water users. These subsidies would ensure the
49. Javier Uche, Anejo 1. Costes energiticos, in Alegaciones al Proyecto de Transferencias
Autorizadas por la Ley del Plan Hidrol6gico Nacional y Estudio de Impacto Ambiental 20 (Jos6
Albiac ed., CITA-DGA, Working Paper No. 03/3, 2003).
50. This demand amounts to 52 hm3 in Baix Segura, 53 hm 3 in Campo de Cartagena,
110 hi 3 in Valle del Guadalentfn, 43 hm 3 in Campo Nijar, and 69 hm3 in Campo Dallas.
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survival of the less profitable agricultural activities supported by the
Common Agricultural Policy. Subsidizing diverted water for agricultural
use would be costly for non-agricultural water users of Segura because
the surcharge would come to 187 million E. Establishing the surcharge on
present urban and industrial use in the Murcia region and on the future
transfer allotment reserved for urban and industrial use implies a
surcharge for this group of users of about 0.76 €/m 3, resulting in a final
price of 1.62 E/m 3. The subsidy needed to maintain the whole 561 hm3 of
transferred water for agriculture at the present low water prices paid by
farmers in the southeast amounts to 301 million E per year (see Table 5).
This option is frankly unjustifiable, either in terms of economics
or equity, since non-profitable agricultural activities would be
maintained in an unsustainable framework while the diverted water
resources would degrade the ecological functioning of the donating
basin. It may also prove politically unfeasible: in the United States, the
experience with the Central Arizona Project was that the urban users of
imported water rebelled when they were asked to subsidize excessively
low prices for the agricultural users.
The economic analysis presented above differs in several
fundamental ways from that conducted by the Spanish Ministry of
Environment.51 The documents of the National Hydrological Plan (NHP)
consider the effects of the water transfer on agricultural quasi-rent,
revenue, and employment in the irrigation areas of the southeastern
receiving basins. As indicated above, the procedure used lacks rigor
since it starts with a fixed volume of water to be transferred from the
Ebro without justifying the quantity. This volume of water is then
divided by a standard irrigation assignment per hectare, and in this way
the affected acreage is calculated. Total quasi-rent is estimated by
multiplying this acreage by a representative quasi-rent per hectare. This
procedure is excessively simple and poorly supported and thus cannot
be regarded as reliable.
The procedure used for the present study is more consistent with
economic theory and more precise because it incorporates the acreage of
each crop by county, meteorological information relevant for modeling
irrigation water demand, agronomic data on yields and costs, and
technical information about irrigation systems. Most importantly, the
marginal value of water is calculated in each county of the receiving
basins and water demand responds to changes in water prices.
There are several striking differences when comparing the
results of the present study with those of the NHP. The NHP estimates
51. See ANALISIS ECONOMICOS, supra note 9.
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the quasi-rent losses from banning aquifer overdraft at 210 million ,52
while the loss of quasi-rent in this study has been valued at 408 million E,
which is distributed between losses of 46 million in Jficar, 101 million in
Segura, and 261 million in Almeria (see Table 5). Notably, more than 70
percent of losses occur in Almeria, and yet the NHP assignment to
Almeria for groundwater overdraft fails to cover the current overdraft.53
Clearly, this water transfer has no economic justification based on
southeastern agriculture because Almeria is the zone where the
elimination of groundwater overdraft has the greatest economic impact
and, despite being easily able to pay the high price of diverted water,54 it
does not receive a sufficient share to eliminate overdraft.
Regarding the impact on employment, the NHP points out that
there are 76,000 agricultural jobs in the Segura basin and asserts that,
without the water transfer project, employment would fall to 52,000 (a
reduction of 24,000 jobs), while under the project it would grow to
102,000 jobs (an additional 26,000 jobs). It is difficult to see where this
employment growth would come from since, according to the NHP, the
fall in quasi-rent would be 210 million E when the aquifer overdraft is
eliminated, which could in turn provoke a fall of 24,000 in jobs, while the
growth in quasi-rent from irrigation guarantee reckoned to be 12 million
E, and it is doubtful that this increase would generate 26,000 jobs.
In our analysis, the number of jobs in the Segura basin is
estimated at 88,600, which approaches the figure of 76,000 estimated by
the NHP. This present study evaluates the loss in employment due to the
overdraft ban in the counties of Murcia and Alicante in the Segura basin
at 12,200 jobs, which is half the loss of 24,000 indicated in the NHP.
Summing up, the NHP measures the benefits of the project on
the basis of estimates of avoided losses in quasi-rent and employment,
but the procedure used to estimate those losses is very questionable and
is not consistent with accepted economic practice. Losses for the entire
receiving area are estimated in a crude manner without allowing for any
spatial variation between basins, provinces, or counties. Most
importantly, quasi-rent losses are calculated by using a single average
value product of water (0.75 E/m 3), whereas the correct measure should
52. The NHP states that lack of enhanced reliability of agricultural water supply
causes additional quasi-rent losses amounting to 12 million E.
53. Overdraft in Almeria is 71 hm3 and Almeria receives only 58 hm3. Segura receives
362 hm3 for agriculture, 142 hm3 more than the groundwater overdraft in the basin and 68
hm3 more than the effective demand for water at the price charged for imported water.
54. Current shadow prices of water are 3.43 E/m 3 in Campo Dallas, 0.29 E/m 3 in
Campo Nijar, and 0.23 E/m 3 in Bajo Almanzora (Table 3). When groundwater overdraft is
forbidden, shadow prices rise to 5.21 E/m 3 in Campo Dalias, 4.19 E/m 3 in Campo Nijar,
and 0.56 E/m 3 in Bajo Almanzora (Figure 4).
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be the marginal value of water from additional water supplies. In our
analysis, water demand in each county responds to water prices because
farmers may change crop mixes and because some rough measure of
land quality and other spatial factors are included through crop yields
and water input variability.
A Workable Combined Alternative to the Ebro Transfer
Finally, we consider an alternative more suitable than either an
aquifer overdraft ban or an increase in water prices, one that combines
both demand and supply measures. This alternative combines banning
groundwater overdraft, trading water among counties, and supplying
desalinated seawater to selected coastal counties.
Existing conveying facilities are used for water trading between
counties along main rivers and canals according to shadow prices of
water in each county. Figure 4 shows these conveying facilities and the
shadow prices of water by county when groundwater overdraft is
forbidden. The main rivers in the three basins are the Turia, JfIcar,
Vinalop6, Segura, Guadalentin, Almanzora, and Andarax, and the
Segura tributaries Argos and Quipar. The main canals are the Jacar-
Turia and Acequia Real canals, which run south to north in the Jficar
basin, and the Canal Margen Izquierda, Canal de Crevillente, Canal
Campo de Cartagena, and Canal Margen Derecha in the Segura basin.
The water shadow prices in each county are calculated under prohibition
of groundwater overdraft and these shadow prices indicate that water
transfers may take place along the Vinalop6, Segura (including the Argos
and Quipar tributaries), Guadalentin, Almanzora, and Andarax rivers,
and along the Canal Margen Izquierda and Canal Campo de Cartagena
(see Figure 4). Seawater desalination is considered only for Campo
Dallas and Campo Nijar counties, which exhibit the highest water
shadow prices of all coastal counties.
The welfare gain from water trading and desalination is
measured by the economic surplus 55 so that the solution of water trading
and desalination flows is found by maximizing welfare (see Figure 5).
Results from the combined scenario show a significant reduction of 362
hm3 in water use and moderate losses of 83 million C in quasi-rent (see
Tables 4 and 5). The reassignment of water among counties increases
welfare by 88 million C and the additional desalinated seawater supplied
to Campo Dalias (49 hm3) and Campo Nijar (11 hm3) increases welfare
by 237 million C, with a total welfare gain of 325 million E. This is simply
55. This represents the area between water excess supply and excess demand functions
in each county.
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the difference in quasi-rent when shifting from the overdraft ban (-408
mill. E) to the combined alternative (-83 mill. E).56
RANKING THE WATER MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES
The results from each of the water management alternatives are
summarized in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 presents water demand scenarios
under each alternative and the water allocation of the Ebro project. Table
5 shows farmers' quasi-rent losses under each alternative and, hence, the
subsidies needed in order to maintain farmers' quasi-rent.
Table 4. Water Demand Scenarios in Southeastern Basins and Ebro Project Allocation (hm3)
Jicar Basin Segura Sur Basin TotalBasin Southeast
Current Water Demand 1,450 863 232 2,545
Water Demand Reduction for
gricultural Use...
.. through a groundwater overdraft ban 139 213 70 422
...through a 0.12 E/m3 water price increase 313 142 54 509
..through a 0.18 E/m3 water price increase 350 181 74 605
..through the combined alternatives
(overdraft ban, water markets, 139 213 10 362
desalination)
Ebro Project Allocation
Alluses 300 420 100 820
Agricultural and environmental use 141 362 58 561
Urban and industrial use 159 58 42 259
Effective Demand of Water for
Agricultural Use...
..at transferred water prices (0.20 to 1.05 761 294 132 1,187
•/m3)
56. These results can be implemented because of the recent completion of the
Carboneras desalination plant in Campo Nijar county. The capacity of the Carboneras plant
is 42 hm 3, of which 15 are for urban use and 27 for agricultural use; another desalination
plant is planned in Campo Dallas. In Campo Nijar county, overdraft amounts to 25 hm3
and effective demand at desalination prices is 42 hm3. But local water experts indicate that
farmers are reluctant to buy the whole 27 hm 3 of desalinated water from Carboneras at the
high desalination price. This problem may be worked out if the projected "water highway"
conveying facility linking Campo Nijar and Campo Dallas is built, since in Campo Dallas
the overdraft is 40 hm 3 and the effective demand is 69 hm 3.However, the water authority
intends to solve the problem in Campo Nijar by subsidizing the price of desalinated water,
charging farmers a reduced price of 0.30 E/m 3 instead of the 0.52 full price. The water
administration has suggested that eventually the water price may be increased, reducing
the subsidy in case of a strong irrigation demand.
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Farmers' quasi-rent losses are calculated by comparing each
alternative with the current situation. Quasi-rent is above 1,700 million C
under the present baseline scenario, which is reduced to around 1,400
million E by increasing water prices by 0.12 E/m 3 and to 1,300 million E
by increasing water prices by 0.18 E/m 3. Banning groundwater overdraft
reduces quasi-rent to 1,300 million E. Under the combined alternative,
quasi-rent exceeds 1,600 million E, which is higher than under any other
measure. The Ebro transfer project maintains current farmers' quasi-rent
but requires 300 million E in subsidies to maintain the low water prices
currently paid by farmers.
Table 5. Quasi-Rent Losses under Alternative Scenarios and Subsidies (Million f Pe Year)
Jficar Basin Segura Sur Total
Basin Basin Southeast
Current Quasi-rent 586 536 589 1,711
Quasi-rent Losses to Farmers...
... through a groundwater overdraft ban 46 101 261 408
through a 0.12 C/m 3 water price increase 166 94 27 287
through a 0.18 C/m3 water price increase 232 136 37 405
.. through the combined alternative (overdraft 39 49 -5 83
ban, water markets, desalination)
Subsidies Needed by the Ebro Project...
.. to cover gap between costs of transferred
water 54 187 60 301
(0.20 to 1.05 E/m 3) and present low water prices I
A sharp reduction in water demand is achieved by raising
irrigation water prices by between 0.12 and 0.18 E/m 3 . The current 2,550
hm3 of demand for irrigation water falls by 500 to 600 hm3, but the costs
to farmers in quasi-rent losses are also quite high in the range of 300 to
400 million E. A ban on groundwater overdraft is the worst solution
because the fall in water demand is only 400 hm3, considerably less than
the reduction achieved by increasing prices, while costs to farmers are
higher than under the water pricing alternatives. The combined
alternative of an overdraft ban, water markets, and desalination reduces
irrigation demand by almost 400 hm3 at a much lower cost of less than
100 million E in terms of farmers' quasi-rent. The combined alternative
ensures an end to aquifer overdraft, improves upon any other demand
management measure, and is more suitable than the Ebro transfer
project.
Some caveats are in order with respect to the difficulties of
implementing demand management measures. Decades of water
resource mismanagement in the southeastern basins of the Iberian
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Peninsula have created pervasive pressures on water resources and a
severe degradation problem. The measure of banning aquifer overdraft
would be very difficult to achieve, since there is at present no effective
control on the number of wells or the volume of abstractions. Various
authors5 7 have indicated that the key reasons for groundwater
mismanagement are that rules are not enforced by basin authorities
because of a lack of resources and will58 and that public and private
registers of subsurface water rights are largely incomplete. Other
authors5 9 strongly support groundwater use, although they recognize
that its chaotic development may lead to depletion, quality degradation,
and negative effects on ecosystems. As a common pool resource, aquifers
present significant managerial challenges.
Water pricing measures are also difficult to implement because
farmers will oppose price increases. Additionally, although basin
authorities can modify the water prices charged to collective irrigation
systems using surface water, they have no control over the costs faced by
individual farmers pumping from aquifers. Even if water pricing could
be implemented on individual abstractions, price increases will not
reduce demand in irrigation areas based on very profitable greenhouse
production. An example of this is the shadow price of water in Campo
Dallas, where prices would need to escalate from the current 0.21 E/m 3
to over 3 f/m 3 in order to curb demand.
As indicated, the creation of water markets is also a difficult
task. Although informal water transactions occur, the possibility of
formal water markets introduced by the 1999 Water Law reform has not
spurred any significant trading in the last six years due to the farmers'
mistrust of formal water markets.
Augmenting water supply by publicly financed desalination is
much more straightforward. The problem arises with the lack of
irrigation demand if water is not subsidized and farmers have to face
high desalination prices. The potential of desalination is given by the
effective demand for desalinated seawater, which reaches a volume of
almost 400 hm3 in coastal counties from Safor to Campo Dalias, at the
0.52 E/m 3 cost of desalinated seawater. The obvious locations for
desalination plants are Campo Dallas and Campo Nfjar, with a combined
57. See, e.g., N. Hernndez-Mora, L. Martinez & J. Forns, Intensive Groundwater Use in
Spain, in INTENSIVE USE OF GROUNDWATER: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNmES 387 (Ram6n
Llamas & Emilio Custodio eds., 2003).
58. Programs to install water quality control stations were started ten years ago by
basin authorities in Spain, but the Segura basin, with the worst water quality problems, is
one of the few basins where these stations are not yet operational.
59. See, e.g., R. Llamas & P. Martinez, Intensive Groundwater Use: Silent Revolution and
Potential Source of Social Conflicts, 131 ASCE J. WATER RESOURcES PLAN. & MGMT. 337 (2005).
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effective demand amounting to 111 hrn3. Other obvious locations for
desalination plants to supply water to greenhouses are Campo de
Cartagena and Valle de Guadalentin counties.
What prevents this effective demand from materializing is that
farmers are extracting water from aquifers at pumping costs of around
0.09 to 0.18 E/m 3 . Since pumping costs are considerably below those for
desalination, farmers will not buy desalinated water. Public investments
in desalination plants become reasonable only under a strict enforcement
by the water authority of an aquifer overdraft ban that would force
farmers to buy desalinated water.
This last point demonstrates the problem facing the new AGUA
project, which is supposed to replace the Ebro transfer. The AGUA
project involves investing 1,200 million E to achieve a desalination
capacity of 600 hin 3, including around 300 hri3 for irrigation between
Campo Dallas and Marina Alta coastal counties. As indicated above,
effective demand in these counties could hypothetically amount to 400
hm3, but implementation of the AGUA project requires the strict
enforcement of an aquifer overdraft prohibition, which is a daunting
challenge for the water authority. The risk of the AGUA project is that,
after public funds are invested in desalination plants, the irrigation
demand does not materialize.
The debate continues on the Ebro transfer project and the AGUA
project in Spain. The former central government used the Ebro transfer
project to gain political support and votes in the receiving water transfer
regions of Valencia and Murcia, which are highly populated.60 At the
same time, it lost support in Arag6n and the Ebro delta regions located
in the donating basin, where both population and votes are quite low.
The 2004 elections brought a new central government that cancelled the
Ebro project, replacing it with the AGUA project. The regions of Valencia
and Murcia, where there is continued demand for the Ebro transfer,
await a change of government in the next parliamentary elections of
2008. Reinstatement of the Ebro project is highly unlikely, however, not
60. Some authors claim that the real aim of the Ebro transfer was to guarantee further
urban development of the Spanish Mediterranean coast, 35 percent of which was already
urbanized in the year 2000, as indicated by the European Environment Agency, Corine
land cover database 2000 (2005). Two recent developments support this claim, one is the
half-million houses planned between Mazarr6n and Carboneras (100 km) along the new
highway being built between Cartagena and Vera, in one of the last pieces of unspoiled
Mediterranean coast. The other is the Fourtou Report just approved by the European
Parliament, asking for a suspension of plans to build 150,000 houses on the Valencia coast.
Coast damage from urban development is serious, and the European Commission is
threatening Spain with bringing the Valencia urban development law to the Court of
Justice of the European Union.
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Figure 1. The Tajo-Segura Water Transfer Project in the Plan of 1933.
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only because the AGUA project will alleviate the water scarcity problem,
but also because, as a result of the EU enlargement, Spain will no longer
be eligible for EU funding after 2008.
CONCLUSION
This study analyzes the economic rationale behind the Ebro
inter-basin transfer, the main project of the Spanish National
Hydrological Plan of 2001. The debate in Spain over the Ebro project has
been very keen and has raised important issues related to water
resources management. The debate deteriorated into squabbling
between the main Spanish political parties and tough conflicts among
the water donating and receiving territories. It also faced strong
opposition from water resource experts and environmental and social
organizations.
The study focuses on the shortcomings of the Ebro project and
the evaluation of several alternative water policies for solving the water
scarcity problem in southeastern Spain. The Ebro transfer project
followed the long-established supply approach used in hydrological
planning in Spain during the twentieth century, which expanded
irrigation from one to 3.5 million hectares. The Ebro project was
grounded on a pure engineering underpinning, traditional in Spanish
water planning. Several important limitations of the project are that
intermediate augmentations of supply are not considered, no economic
justification is given for the water intended for agriculture, and
agricultural benefits are not constant, as assumed in the project, but
depend on the quantity of water transferred and the elasticity of demand
for imported water in each agricultural activity and region.
The outdated "ability to pay" analysis used in evaluating the
project is based on the average value of water. This single average value
is used to estimate the avoided losses of quasi-rent and labor from
building the project, instead of the methodologically correct marginal
value of water. This approach disregards the demand response to water
prices by ignoring that farmers may change crop mixes and by
overlooking the spatial heterogeneity of investments in irrigation and the
varying quality of land.
Several water management demand and supply alternatives to
the Ebro project have been examined, focusing on the response of water
demand to these alternatives and their effects on farmers' quasi-rent. The
demand management measures are an aquifer overdraft ban and water
pricing, while the supply measures are the Ebro transfer project and
seawater desalination. The introduction of water markets has also been
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examined, although the institutional water framework precludes the
smooth development of water trading.
Results indicate that differentiated water management policies
are best suited for each basin. In areas with high shadow prices of water,
the overdraft ban alternative results in steep quasi-rent losses to farmers.
Conversely, in areas with low shadow prices of water, the alternative of
increasing water prices generates steep quasi-rent losses. Because
reductions in demand could be achieved by controlling water
abstractions or by water pricing, the measure of choice in the Jiicar and
Segura basins, where water shadow prices are low, is to ban aquifer
overdraft rather than increase water prices. In the Sur basin, where water
shadow prices are high, prohibition of aquifer overdraft should be
coupled with augmenting water supply through desalination in order to
avoid steep quasi-rent losses to farmers. Additionally, allowing water
trading between counties may moderate the negative income effects of
controlling water abstractions to prevent overdraft.
Implementation of demand management measures in agricul-
ture is problematic, however, because a ban on aquifer overdraft would
be difficult after longstanding water resource mismanagement in the
area, and water pricing or water markets will be met by opposition from
farmers. Losses to farmers should be compensated; otherwise an
excessive burden on agricultural activities will be met by social
opposition, causing the measures to fail.
The most advantageous outcomes can only be achieved through
compromise solutions, where water demand and supply management
measures are combined and adapted to each basin. Along these lines, the
best alternative is a combination of measures including overdraft control,
water markets, and desalination; this curbs demand by almost 400 hn 3
in southeastern basins at costs below 100 million E per year in terms of
quasi-rent losses to farmers. In comparison, the Ebro project maintains
farmers' quasi-rent but needs 300 million E per year in subsidies to bring
the high costs of transferred water down to the level that farmers are
paying now. These 300 million C in subsidies are only the market social
costs of the Ebro project, and a correct assessment of the project costs and
benefits requires an explicit economic valuation of the project's environ-
mental impacts.
Seawater desalination is a quick and relatively low-cost water
source for urban, industrial, and agricultural users in coastal counties.
The construction of desalination plants for irrigation in the coastal
counties south of Campo de Cartagena appears to be a good alternative
since greenhouse production is a very dynamic sector that can pay for
the water.
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Seawater desalination under the AGUA project is the water
policy alternative to the Ebro transfer chosen by the present government.
The implementation of the AGUA project requires the enforcement of
surface and subsurface water extraction limits, which is a daunting
challenge for the water administration. The risk of the AGUA project is
that, once public investments in desalination plants are completed, the
irrigation demand may fail to materialize because current water
extractions continue.
Finally, a striking feature of both the Ebro project of the former
government and the AGUA project of the current administration is that
both focus exclusively on water supply and not at all on environmental
restoration. In the United States and other countries, any water project of
this magnitude would include environmental restoration as one of the
basic objectives. Future water plans need to take seriously the goal of
environmental restoration and improvement in southeastern basins. In
the Segura and Sur basins, the consequence of the large imbalance
between water supply and demand is a serious water scarcity problem.
Additionally, water quality is impaired by pollution both from point
sources, including treated and semi-treated sewage and industrial
wastes, and non-point sources, including pesticide and nutrients from
agricultural and urban runoff. Any chosen alternative will not work
without the enforcement of effective rules protecting water resources by
the water authority.
The effort to meet this challenge will surely involve reallocating
some water from off-stream use by agricultural, urban, and industrial
users to environmental uses both in aquifers and streams, and also in the
coastal wetlands. It will also involve other measures such as the control
of non-point pollution, the recovery or artificial construction of wetlands
for nutrient removal, and habitat restoration. The experience in the
United States and elsewhere worldwide is that this type of environ-
mental restoration and improvement can generate significant economic
benefits associated with recreation, eco-tourism, and the non-use value
of ecosystem protection, which may outweigh the benefits from
agricultural and even urban water use. This is a key question in
southeastern basins because of the importance of present and potential
tourism activities that would be spoiled by water resources mismanage-
ment and reckless urban development.
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